I. Introduction
This chapter explores the use of detention as a response to terrorism in the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. I have chosen to focus on these three countries because it is clear that Australia has taken some leads from the US and UK in this area as a result of its close connections with them. The three countries have obvious cultural connections and they were all members of the 'coalition of the willing' that invaded Iraq in 2003. It is apparent that detention has become a favoured preventative measure in the 'fight against terror' in all three countries, and that the rules that would generally govern and constrain detention have altered dramatically. Indeed, the rules are so different, subject to so many ongoing changes, and based on such flimsy rationales that they lack legitimacy.
In this chapter, I also comment on the relationship between detention and torture. Places of detention are often places of torture, which is one reason for human rights safeguards surrounding detention such as the right to come before a judge. The interrogation techniques used by the US in Guantánamo Bay have been denounced as torture by international non-government organisations, as well as bodies within the United Nations human rights system. 1 Meanwhile, the UK has sought to deport people whom it would otherwise wish to keep in detention on the basis of 'diplomatic assurances' that torture will not occur once the person is returned to their home country, assurances that should carry little, if any, weight.
Various argumentative strategies used by governments to support the use of detention and to circumvent the prohibition on torture, the flaws in these strategies, and possible long-term ramifications for core human rights norms such as the prohibitions on arbitrary detention and against torture are examined. I will focus on two principal arguments put by governments, which are sometimes interrelated. One is to deny that a person is truly a person entitled to all human rights -for example, by attempting to differentiate between aliens and citizens, or lawful and unlawful combatants. The other is to put the person in a legal 'black hole', to use Lord Steyn's terminology, 2 whether by removing the person from a state's territory, or creating executive-controlled detention -for example, by depriving courts of jurisdiction. A third argument will also be noted along the way. This is the 'balancing' argument, namely that human rights need to be balanced against national security, which is another route to the same resultdenial of a person's rights as a fellow human being, or a justification for putting them into a legal black hole.
II. The Black Hole of Guantánamo Bay
The analogy of the black hole was first employed as a description of Guantánamo Bay by Lord Steyn in the Twenty-Seventh F A Mann Lecture 4 in order to describe the right-less vacuum into which the US sought to place the detainees in Guantánamo Bay. 5 The analogy also warns that by denying the detainees' status as rights-holders, US society itself -not just the detainees, who are usually, but not always, foreigners 6 -may be sucked into the vortex.
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Four years after Lord Steyn gave his speech, US policy in relation to Guantánamo Bay remains largely unchanged, although there have been some important victories in US courts and some strong denunciations of US policy at the international level. The US government has tried to shield its policies from scrutiny with variations on the theme of the black hole, such as attempting to deprive US courts of jurisdiction or denying that treaties that prohibit torture extend to Guantánamo. I turn first to examine the extent to which US courts have confronted and dismissed the strategies outlined above.
A. Staring into the Abyss? Confronting Jurisdictional Limits before US Courts
US courts have granted the detainees some recognition of their rights, resulting in changes to the legislative regime governing the treatment of the detainees.
In Hamdi v Rumsfield, 8 the Court found that detainees had the right to challenge their classification as an enemy combatant before a neutral decision-maker. Combatant Status Review Tribunals were then established for the purposes of this task.
In Hamdan v Rumsfeld, the Court held that the military commissions established to try Guantánamo detainees were not validly constituted, because, among other things, they violated common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 9 Article 3 requires detainees to be tried by a 'regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.'
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This phrase incorporates the customary international legal requirements for a fair trial, including the right of accused persons both to be present at their trial and to see the evidence against them.
to failure. The very act of regulation contradicts the concept of the black hole, and opens the US government up to scrutiny on the basis of standards that are not of the executive's making. In the latest of the Guantánamo detainees' victories against the US government, the US Court of Appeals (DC Circuit) held that in order for the courts to fulfil their role in 'determining the validity' of a Combatant Status Review Tribunal's determination under the Detainee Treatment Act 2005 (USA), the court must be able to view the Government Information with the aid of counsel for both parties; [and] a detainee's counsel who has seen only the subset of the Government Information presented to the Tribunal is in no position to aid the court. There is simply no other way for the counsel to present an argument that the Recorder withheld exculpatory evidence from the Tribunal in violation of the specified procedures.
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The US government has, however, attempted to keep at bay what is perhaps the most fundamental question concerning US courts' jurisdiction -the constitutional right of detainees to petition the court for habeas corpus -using the device of 'jurisdiction stripping' 13 The US has also sought to rely on the black hole conceit at the international level. In its dealings with the UN Human Rights system, the US has denied that the human rights treaties to which it is party apply in Guantánamo. The US relies on the fact that Guantánamo is not fully 'sovereign' US territory (as opposed to being completely within US jurisdiction). The US has also relied on strained readings of the terms of the treaties as well as US reservations to them. In their report, the five mandate-holders made several damning conclusions. First, they concluded that the detention is, or rather the detentions are, governed by general international human rights law, despite the US's insistence that they are governed solely by the law of armed conflict. From this starting point, they went on to find that the detentions and military commissions are in breach of Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) -the right to liberty -as well as Article 14 which guarantees the right to a fair trial.
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The finding that general human rights law governs the situation is made after the mandate-holders draw attention to several important factual variations in the detention of particular detainees. These concern:
1. The context in which persons were initially detained -whether on the battle-field in Afghanistan or, rather, off the battle-field in a distinctly civilian context as in the case of six Algerians arrested in Bosnia-Herzegovina (a factor which was also important to the Supreme Court in Hamdan when it found the military commissions to be invalidly constituted); 21 2. The purpose for which the persons are detained -whether they are 'combatants' detained for the duration of the armed conflict or persons detained for criminal prosecution as a result of activities that took place during such conflict, or, by contrast, persons detained for the illegitimate purpose of intelligence-gathering; and 3. The prevailing context of the detentions, namely whether the United States was or continued to be currently engaged in an international armed conflict between two parties to the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions.
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The mandate-holders said that the US was not, at the time of their investigation, engaged in an international armed conflict. 23 Accordingly, it was not permissible for the US to read down the guarantees associated with the protection against arbitrary detention in Article 9 of the ICCPR so that they cohere with the lex specialis prevailing during a time of international armed conflict. 24 The mandate-holders noted that the US is a party to the ICCPR and that Article 2 of the ICCPR applies to persons within the effective control of the state party, whether or not they are within the physical territory of the state party.
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The US response to this finding was as follows:
The United States … is engaged in a continuing armed conflict against Al Qaida … the law of war applies to the conduct of that war and … related detention operations, and … the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by its express terms, applies only to "individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction." … The Report's legal analysis rests on [a] flawed position … [which] leads to a manifestly absurd result; that is, during an ongoing armed conflict, unlawful combatants receive more procedural rights than would lawful combatants under the Geneva Conventions.
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There are several problems with this response. The main one lies in the US argument that the global 'war on terror' is an armed conflict, rather than a struggle against various groups committing criminal acts. It is to be expected that all persons receive more procedural rights than lawful combatants under the Geneva Conventions when there is no armed conflict. On the other hand, the Supreme Court accepted that Hamdan had been detained during the course of a non-international armed conflict in Afghanistan, in which case some of the laws of war are applicable. 27 However, the Supreme Court did acknowledge problems with using military commissions with respect to particular detainees where they had not been detained within the theatre of war and when the charges against them did not relate to well-established war crimes. 28 The report of the mandate-holders and the decision of the Supreme Court in Hamdan both demonstrate that while there may be some aspects of the 'war on terror' that really do involve armed conflict and require the invocation of the laws of war, the attempt to categorise every governmental action against every detainee as part of a 'war' is ridiculous.
As for the distinction between unlawful combatants and lawful combatantsterminology that is not contained in any international instrument dealing with international humanitarian law -that distinction means that those designated as unlawful combatants forfeit possible status as prisoners of war. However, this does not leave them in a rights vacuum. They cannot be tortured, they are still entitled to a fair trial and they may not be arbitrarily detained. 29 There are fundamental linkages between these three aspects of the detainees' treatment in Guantánamo Bay as it is clear that the prolonged detention and other forms of ill-treatment occurring there will impact on any prospect of a fair trial at the end of the day.
Finally, the interpretation adopted by the Human Rights Committee in relation to the language of Article 2 of the ICCPR, 30 upon which the five mandate-holders draw, is preferable to that adopted by the US. Article 2 requires a state party 'to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.' The word 'and' in Article 2 is read disjunctively, rather than as imposing cumulative prerequisites for legal responsibility. The Committee has recently pointedly reaffirmed its interpretation in its concluding observations on the US periodic report under 28 Above n 9, (Stevens J), 2777-8 (relating to when and where persons were apprehended); 2779-86 (concerning the need for a well-established war crime). 29 The prohibition on torture is a well-accepted norm of jus cogens. According to the Human Rights Committee, the rights to a fair trial and the prohibition on arbitrary detention, while not listed as non-derogable rights in art 4 of the ICCPR, are also jus cogens and may never be derogated from. Article 40 of the ICCPR. 31 The Human Rights Committee's reading is one of the alternatives open on the ordinary meaning of the text and it is the one that coheres with the object and purpose of the treaty and the intentions of the framers. 32 The language of Article 2 was designed to avoid responsibility in situations where another sovereign was responsible -for example, in the case of occupying troops. 33 The US, on the other hand, seeks to achieve the opposite (and manifestly absurd) result in relation to Guantánamo Bay, namely to do what it would not be allowed to do on US soil in a geographical region that is technically not part of the US but that is nevertheless subject to its physical and legal jurisdiction as a result of its lease agreement with Cuba.
C. The Terrorists Unmasked
The attacks the philosophical basis for arguments that torture may sometimes be justified. In this chapter, I offer a more limited, legal discussion of the issues as they arose in the context of the exchange between the mandate-holders and the US, and in the context of subsequent consideration by the Human Rights Committee of the US' second and third periodic reports under the ICCPR.
There are four main aspects of the treatment of the Guantánamo detainees that raise allegations of torture. They are the interrogation techniques; the overall conditions of detention; excessive force during transportation; and force-feeding of detainees on hunger strike. The five mandate-holders' report found that the conditions of detention, in particular the uncertainty about the length of detention and prolonged solitary confinement, amount to inhuman treatment and to a violation of the right to health as well as a violation of the right of detainees under Article 10(1) of the ICCPR to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
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The excessive violence and force-feeding were found to constitute torturethe latter finding evoking an expression of 'bewilderment' by the US given that the purpose of force-feeding is to save lives. 36 Interesting as this aspect of the treatment of detainees is, I will focus on the issue of the interrogation techniques, which have attracted so much attention in the media.
As described by the mandate-holders' report, the interrogation techniques authorised at the time of writing the report were as follows:
• B. Incentive/Removal of Incentive ie, comfort items;
• S. Change of Scenery Down might include exposure to extreme temperatures and deprivation of light and auditory stimuli; • U. Environmental Manipulation: Altering the environment to create moderate discomfort (eg, adjusting temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell).
• V. Sleep Adjustment; Adjusting the sleeping times of the detainee (eg, reversing sleep cycles from night to day). This technique is not sleep deprivation.
• X. Isolation: Isolating the detainee from other detainees while still complying with basic standards of treatment.
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The US has defended these techniques with various arguments, the first of which is a narrow reading of the definition of torture. In a notorious advice from J S Bybee, then Assistant Attorney-General, to Alberto Gonzales, then Counsel advising the President, torture was defined as follows:
[W]e conclude that torture as defined in and proscribed by Sections 2340-2340A [of title 18 of the United States Code], covers only extreme acts. Severe pain is generally of the kind difficult for the victim to endure. Where the pain is physical, it must be of an intensity akin to that which accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure. Severe mental pain requires suffering not just at the moment of infliction but it also requires lasting psychological harm, such as seen in mental disorders like posttraumatic stress disorder. … Because the acts inflicting torture are extreme, there is a significant range of acts that though they might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment fail to rise to the level of torture. … Finally, even if an interrogation method might violate Section 2340A, necessity or self-defense could provide justifications that would eliminate any criminal liability. 
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This memorandum has been overtaken by the memorandum from former Acting Assistant Attorney-General, Daniel Levin, to James B Comey, then Deputy Attorney-General. 41 Nevertheless, it seems plain from the US' response to the five mandate-holders' report that the US still seeks to rely on the arguments put forward in the original advice. In its response to the report, the US coyly, cryptically and in my view, largely mischievously, asserted that the mandate-holders, have relied on international human rights instruments … without serious analysis of whether the instruments by their terms apply extraterritorially; whether the United States is a State Party -or has filed reservations or understandingsto the instrument; whether the instrument … is legally binding or not; or whether the provisions cited have the meaning ascribed to them in the Unedited Report.
42
The argument concerning extra-territoriality has already been dealt with. 43 The next question is whether the reservations -another kind of 'black hole' -provide an excuse for the US.
The US has entered reservations to Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 16 of the Convention against Torture stipulating that the US is bound by the provisions concerning cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 'only insofar as the term … means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.' 44 The US has also entered a 'declaration of understanding' to Article 1 of the Convention against Torture. Article 1 contains the definition of torture. The US 'understanding' is as follows:
The United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. 45 Interestingly, the US did not enter a similar reservation to the ICCPR, which, although it does not define torture, does prohibit it. This raises an arcane question. Given that the Convention against Torture definition is read into Article 7 of the ICCPR, could the US rely on its reservation to the Convention against Torture with respect to its obligations under the ICCPR? The answer has to be no. The Human Rights Committee did not consider such an argument when it expressed concerns about the interrogation techniques in its concluding observations on the US periodic report under Article 40 of the ICCPR. 46 This is undoubtedly because the US is required to enter appropriate reservations to all treaties to which it becomes party if it wishes to narrow its obligations.
In any event, I doubt that the reservation or the understanding is helpful to the US. Although treaties that are mere exchanges of obligations between States allow them to reserve inter se application of rules of general international law, it is otherwise in human rights treaties, which are for the benefit of persons within their jurisdiction. Accordingly, provisions in the Covenant that represent customary international law (and a fortiori when they have the character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of reservations. Accordingly, a State may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to torture, to subject persons to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, to deny freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to presume a person guilty unless he proves his innocence, to execute pregnant women or children, to permit the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of marriageable age the right to marry, or to deny to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture, profess their own religion, or use their own language. And while reservations to particular clauses of article 14 may be acceptable, a general reservation to the right to a fair trial would not be. These propositions also stand true for the 'understanding' that might well be a disguised reservation, 51 and which, in any event, could only provide an acceptable interpretation of the treaty if it was consistent with the broader international community's interpretation of torture. This, however, is not the case. In its concluding observations concerning the US' initial report, the Committee against Torture expressed its concern about the US' 'failure to enact a federal crime of torture in terms consistent with article 1 of the Convention', and '[t]he reservation lodged to article 16, in violation of the Convention, the effect of which is to limit the application of the Convention'. 52 The Committee recommended that the US 'withdraw its reservations, interpretations and understandings relating to the Convention'. 53 More recently, in its concluding observations on the US' second report, the Committee reiterated this recommendation as well as making the following, very specific one:
The State party should ensure that acts of psychological torture, prohibited by the Convention, are not limited to 'prolonged mental harm' as set out in the State party's understandings lodged at the time of ratification of the Convention, but constitute a wider category of acts, which cause severe mental suffering, irrespective of their prolongation or its duration. These responses from the Committee against Torture, along with the typically few, but principled objections to the US' reservations and understandings by other states parties, 55 show that the US' right to make the reservations and understandings in question is not accepted.
Having dismissed the contentions concerning extra-territoriality and reservations, the remaining arguments are the definitional question and the argument concerning necessity, which appears as an afterthought in case the definitional arguments are unsustainable and it is necessary to contend that 'anything goes' in wartime. The argument based on necessity should be put to rest first. Simon Bronitt's chapter in this volume 56 refutes the necessity argument on the basis that 'balancing' is an inappropriate framework for dealing with terrorism and human rights, given that its effect is to trade away human rights in the name of 'security'. Similarly, Manderson in Chapter 3 this volume, puts paid to the idea that torture -a consciously manipulative process that seeks to gain a particular end and is used by the state -could ever be viewed as an act of self-defence. Action in self-defence is an immediate response by a person directly under threat. Moreover, it should be noted that although the Bybee-Gonzales memo is discussing domestic US law, as a matter of international law, the US' contention is also unsound. It has already been shown that the laws of war do not oust general human rights law, so any argument concerning 'military necessity' as part of the laws of war may rest on a shaky foundation. The fact that torture is prohibited by the laws of war and is a war crime 57 makes a nonsense of any such argument in any event. It is also highly questionable whether one can mount a case based on a more general defence of necessity that lies outside the parameters of the exceptions established by the governing human rights instruments. . We should note here that the US did not want any interviews to take place. Three of the mandate-holders were offered a one-day visit to Guantánamo Bay by the US government. However, the visit was to be subject to the proviso that no private interviews could be carried out with detainees. The offer was therefore refused as being inconsistent with the work of the special procedures of the UN Commission on Human Rights and interviews were undertaken with former detainees instead. Yet the US castigated the mandate-holders for not basing their conclusions 'clearly in the facts': ibid 53. 62 67 The case concerned foreign terror suspects detained in Belmarsh prison. As is well-known, the Court determined that the detention was discriminatory and disproportionate as nationals suspected of terrorism were not also detained. 68 As a result, the relevant provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK) were repealed -demonstrating that the declarations of incompatibility that the judiciary are empowered to issue under the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) 69 are not toothless. 'Control orders' that impose severe restrictions and that are applicable to all nationals were instituted instead, 70 however. Thus, along with Chris Michaelsen, Chapter 7 in this volume, we may ask whether the Court should have gone further in its decision and questioned the characterisation of the terrorist threat as an emergency that permits such intrusions. In doing so, we note that, as Colm O'Cinneide, Chapter 15 this volume relates, control orders have also been subjected to searching review by the courts. The present chapter looks at the way in which detention was characterised in the context of Belmarsh -as a semi-black hole into which only foreigners could fall and from which they could potentially escape, provided they were willing to run the risk of any consequences when they were returned home.
A. The Belmarsh Detainees: Caught between Liberty and Torture
Detention in Belmarsh prison shared some characteristics with the black hole of Guantánamo, but there were some crucial differences in the way in which the UK tried to justify the detention. The UK's arguments have a decidedly more legal character than the simple and rather rhetorical characterisation by the US of the struggle against terrorism as a 'war'. The UK has attempted to characterise terrorism as a threat to the life of the nation that permits derogation from certain rights. 71 This is, in fact, a questionable characterisation, although Lord Hoffmann was the only judge in the Belmarsh detainees' case willing to take on the executive on this issue. 72 However, it is less extreme than the stand taken by the US.
Moreover, unlike the US, which is determined to hold persons in Guantanámo indefinitely, until such time as the 'war on terror' is over, apparently the UK was and remains keen to get rid of the Belmarsh detainees. Detention was to be indefinite only if the detainees could not be ejected. The obstacle in the path of the UK acting as it wished and deporting foreign suspects, was that the suspects feared they would be tortured upon return. The guarantees against refoulement in Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, 73 and implicit in Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 74 and Article 7 of the ICCPR prevented the UK from returning them. And yet, these suspects had no legal right to be in the UK, thus detention was -as the government saw it -the only option, unless the suspects volunteered to return, or the UK was able to rely on diplomatic assurances to the effect that the person would not be tortured. It was argued before the House of Lords that Belmarsh prison had only three walls, since foreigners could purportedly elect to go home, whereas for nationals the prison would most definitely have four walls.
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Since the 'choice' for the individuals concerned is really no choice at all, and the diplomatic assurances on which the UK seeks to rely have been said to have 71 Art 4 ICCPR. Note that art 9 is not listed as a non-derogable right, however, the Human Rights Committee has stated that art 9, paras (3) and (4) are also non-derogable as they underpin rights that are listed as non-derogable. 'In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention, must Yet it appears that the UK is hell-bent on pursuing the expulsion of the Belmarsh detainees and others like them. Indeed, the UK is so determined, that one senses a ritual purge is taking place. The state, as in Foucault's description of the scaffold, displays its power, 81 even though the effectiveness of the measure in deterring or preventing future crime is highly questionable.
B. Great Britain: Caught between Life and Torture?
It is tempting to see the UK as simply reckless as to whether torture will eventuate -that it regards expulsion to a possible place of torture as an appropriate 76 The Special Rapporteur on the question of torture is particularly clear on this point. In his first report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur, Manfred Nowak, gave a summary of his presentation at a meeting of experts discussing possible guidelines for diplomatic assurances. In addition to the fact that the principle of non-refoulement is non-derogable, he included the following concern. 'Diplomatic assurances are sought from countries with a proven record of systematic torture, i.e., the very fact that such diplomatic assurances are sought is an acknowledgement that the requested State, in the opinion of the requesting State, is practising torture. In most cases, those individuals in relation to whom diplomatic assurances are being sought belong to a high-risk group ('Islamic fundamentalists' This argument is seriously misguided. The submission seeks to pull a dynamic interpretation of provisions that are silent on the question of refoulement back to the notion that there are some people 'unworthy' of protection. Article 5 of the Refugee Convention preserves the more extensive rights that refugees may have under other instruments, and international law has moved on since 1951. The Convention against Torture now expressly prohibits refoulement to a place of torture, on the basis that notions of worthiness are anathema to human rights law. The older and newer law are not incompatible. It is perfectly consistent with the Refugee Convention to exclude someone from refugee status, but to refuse to return such persons to a place of torture because of a recognition of common humanity. The underlying rationale for each position is actually the same. Refugee status is about avoiding complicity in persecution and it is therefore wrong to give 'safe haven', in the sense of giving a persecutor the particular rights that attend refugee status, or to deny a request for extradition in the case of someone accused of a crime. It is equally necessary to avoid 82 complicity in the erasure of humanity that torture inflicts. 87 The best solution is to prosecute or extradite for the purposes of a prosecution.
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In a further attempt to counter the absolute nature of the prohibition on refoulement to a place of torture, the intervening governments make arguments about the standard of proof. They point out that the wording of Article 3 of the Convention against Torture, 'substantial grounds for believing that [a person] would be in danger of being subject to torture,' is open to interpretation, while the standard of proof in a prosecution -beyond reasonable doubt -is high. 89 The governments then argue that they have also to be concerned about the risk to the lives of persons in the community. Thus, it is argued, they need to undertake a balancing act between the rights of citizens and others living in the community, on the one hand, and alien terrorist suspects on the other. 90 In this balancing act, the active duty to protect the right to life of the people in Britain prevails over duties of non-complicity in relation to the prohibition on torture.
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This strategy is deeply concerning. Indeed, it may be more concerning than the US' attempt to justify torture by US officials. Essentially, the UK's intervention seeks to subvert the entire philosophy underlying human rights -that rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and inter-related.
IV. A Parallel Universe -Preventative Detention Down-Under
It is not surprising that when the country in which the writ of habeas corpus was developed attempts to resile from it, its former colonies follow suit. So it is with preventative detention in Australia. The model of preventative detention adopted in this country was based on the UK model under the Terrorism Act 2000, 92 and the apparent trigger was the London bombings of 7 July 2005.
Nothing had occurred in Australia that would have indicated that the legislation was necessary.
In 2005, two anti-terrorism bills were introduced into the Commonwealth Parliament. That legislation sought to introduce preventative detention in cases where it was sought to prevent an imminent terrorist attack or to preserve evidence relating to a recent attack, create a control order regime and update sedition offences, among other things. I will focus here on the provisions concerning preventative detention.
A. The Legislative Scheme for Preventative Detention Orders
Under division 105 of the Criminal Code Act, an initial preventative detention order may be sought for up to 24 hours 93 by a member of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and made by a senior member of the AFP. 94 If detaining someone in connection with an imminent attack -one that will take place within 14 days 95 -the AFP has to be 'satisfied' that:
a. there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the subject: i. will engage in a terrorist act; or ii. possesses a thing that is connected with the preparation for, or the engagement of a person in, a terrorist act; or iii. has done an act in preparation for, or planning, a terrorist act; and b. making the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act occurring; and c. detaining the subject for the period for which the person is to be detained under the order is reasonably necessary for the purpose referred to in paragraph (b). 96 If detaining someone in connection with a recent attack -one that has taken place within the last 28 days 97 -the AFP has to be 'satisfied' that:
a. a terrorist act has occurred within the last 28 days; and b. it is necessary to detain the subject to preserve evidence of, or relating to, the terrorist act; and c. detaining the subject for the period for which the person is to be detained under the order is reasonably necessary for the purpose referred to in paragraph (b). 98 The initial preventative detention order may be extended and further extended, so long as the total period of detention does not exceed 24 hours. The entire period of detention under the initial and continuing preventative detention order is a maximum of 48 hours.
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The reason for the short period of time is that this is federal legislation and there is some concern that any longer period of detention could breach the constitutionally embedded separation of powers doctrine. 104 Deprivation of liberty for the purposes of punishment is accepted as a core feature of judicial power and unduly long detention could transform the detention from non-punitive, preventative detention to impermissible punitive detention ordered by the executive. The States and Territories were to enact their own legislation to provide for detention for up to 14 days, effectively taking over from the Commonwealth if it is thought necessary to detain a person for longer than 48 hours. 105 Under the Commonwealth legislation, there is no court hearing and the proceedings are purposefully ex parte. Although the Act spells out that a remedy (which is not defined) may be sought from a federal court, 106 it appears that in many cases there will be no basis upon which the court could order a remedy such as habeas corpus because the legislation authorises this sort of administrative detention. The jurisdiction of State and Territory supreme courts is specifically ousted with respect to a Commonwealth preventative detention order while that order is on foot. 107 State and Territory supreme courts may, however, review the Commonwealth order on the same grounds on which review is provided for by the relevant legislation in relation to state orders, 108 once a person has been detained under a state order. Also after the detention pursuant to a Commonwealth order is over, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal may determine that the decision to issue the preventative detention order is void and that compensation should be paid.
Quite apart from issues of jurisdiction, it may prove difficult for any detainee to bring proceedings given the problems in securing adequate reasons concerning the order. The detainee must be informed about 'the fact that the preventative detention order has been made in relation to the person', 110 but this does not deal with the reasons for which the order was made. A summary of the grounds on which the order is made must also be supplied, 111 but it is unclear how far this summary might go beyond, say, information that the order was imposed to prevent an imminent attack or to preserve evidence of a past attack. Under Article 9, three requirements must be met. First, the detention must not be arbitrary (art 9(1)). Second, arrested persons must be informed of the reasons for arrest (art 9(2)). Third, proceedings may be taken before a court in order that the court may decide 'without delay' on the lawfulness of the detention (art 9(4)) -lawfulness, according to the jurisprudence of the Committee, meaning that the courts may determine whether or not the detention is arbitrary as a matter of international law.
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It may not be surprising that this apparent legal loophole has been exploited so assiduously, when we consider that Mr Philip Ruddock has until recently been Attorney-General. As Minister for Immigration, Mr Ruddock proved a past master at exploiting the many frustrating silences in the Refugee Convention. However, the Howard government may have misread the relevant international law and placed the bar too low. In relation to Commonwealth preventative detention orders, it appears that there is no meaningful court control as required by Article 9(4) of the ICCPR. Apparently, it is thought that the duration of the detention is so short that meaningful judicial control is not necessary, or that a (most probably) post hoc remedy for detention that is wrongful under Australian law is all that is required. After all, the rule of thumb for bringing an ordinary criminal suspect before a judge appears to be around 48 hours. In the context of pre-trial detention, the Human Rights Committee has suggested guidelines of a couple of days in relation to bringing someone 'promptly' before a court for the purposes of Article 9(3) (which is specific to criminal cases), while a few weeks has been suggested as a guideline for a 'decision without delay' by a court for the purposes of Article 9(4). In any event, the idea that the presumption of liberty enshrined in Article 9(3) has been overturned when it is not contemplated that a full and fair trial will follow, on the basis there will be some remedy if, in fact, the executive got it wrong, should be at least mildly discomforting. An executive-controlled power to detain even for very short periods may be enough to terrorise those persons who experience it.
Australia's legislation underscores the fundamentally problematic nature of preventative detention highlighted by the European Court of Human Rights in Lawless. In Lawless, the Court concluded that its interpretation -that detention could only be for the purposes of bringing someone before a judge, unless the state concerned was derogating from the right to liberty -had to be correct. It warned of the consequences of the alternative interpretation:
anyone suspected of harbouring an intent to commit an offence could be arrested and detained for an unlimited period on the strength merely of an executive decision without its [sic] being possible to regard his arrest or detention as a breach of the Convention; whereas such an assumption, with all its implications of arbitrary power, would lead to conclusions repugnant to the fundamental principles of the Convention.
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Moreover, while the Human Rights Committee's general comment seems to permit preventative detention to some degree, the Committee has also said that it is not possible simply to escape the protections due in ordinary criminal and civil proceedings pursuant to Article 14 of the ICCPR. Article 14(1) states that:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
The Committee's 'concluding observations' in relation to India's third periodic report under the ICCPR with respect to India's use of preventative detention in connection with national security are instructive: 119 24. … The Committee is … of the view that preventive detention is a restriction of liberty imposed as a response to the conduct of the individual concerned, that the decision as to continued detention must be considered as a determination falling within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, and that proceedings to decide the continuation of detention must, therefore, comply with that provision. Therefore:
… In the attempt to avoid judicial scrutiny, the detention regime in Australia shares some similarity with the black hole of Guantánamo Bay. One of the Constitutional heads of power upon which the Commonwealth has relied in order to defend the enactment of the legislation that introduced preventative detention orders is the defence power (s 51(vi) Australian Constitution). A majority of the High Court has accepted that characterisation in a case concerning a challenge to the provisions relating to control orders. 121 Only Justice Kirby dissented on that point, 122 expressing the view that,
[a]s drafted, Div 104 proceeds outside the proper concerns of s 51(vi) and into areas of ordinary civil government. 123 However, it appears that the Australian government views preventative detention orders as consistent with the right to liberty protected by Article 9 ICCPR, and unlike the UK, it certainly has not sought to derogate from its obligations under Article 9. Perhaps, then, rather than being a black hole, a more appropriate comparison is that preventative detention in Australia is like a 'worm hole'. A worm hole is a short cut through time and space. Just as a worm eats its way through the apple from one point to another, instead of wriggling across the apple's surface, it is sometimes suggested that a worm hole may allow us to travel from one parallel universe to another. The Australian legislation is rather like a worm hole as it seeks to place detainees quickly and temporarily into a parallel universe of executive detention that is almost entirely free of judicial scrutiny. And, like the worm hole, legal preventative detention may not exist. At least, the detention may not be legal if there is no possibility of meaningful court control, even, perhaps, if this is for only a brief period of time as under the Commonwealth legislation. 124 The existence or adequacy of court control of the Commonwealth order is not the only point at which Australia may fail to comply with Article 9 of the ICCPR. The question of court control intersects with questions as to whether arbitrary detention could result in any particular case from the AFP being 'satisfied' that there are 'reasonable grounds to suspect' that the prerequisites for the detention are present. The thresholds for detention are low. 125 I think it is arguable that detention pursuant to the provisions concerning preservation of evidence will almost by definition be arbitrary. And while some element of proportionality has been incorporated, there is no explicit consideration as to whether there are less restrictive measures that may be imposed. 126 The existence of remedies against wrongful detention under Australian law is not an adequate safeguard from detention that is arbitrary as a matter of international law. It is also worth reiterating the point that the short duration of the detention does not assuage the concern that the presumption of liberty has been displaced and on so slim a basis.
Finally, there are the questions about the timing and quality of the reasons given to the detainee. 127 The Human Rights Committee has specifically dealt with the situation where the only information given to the detainee was that a person was arrested 'under prompt security measures without any indication of the substance' and the Committee determined that Article 9(2) was violated. 128 The
Australian model appears to go beyond this, but it may be questionable how much information detainees receive. So there are many points at which a human rights lawyer should be critical of the legislation.
C. Liberty or Security of the Person?
As in the US and the UK, there has been an attempt to shift thinking concerning human rights in Australia. 129 The former Australian Attorney-General sought to justify all anti-terrorism legislation with the language of human security. In a speech delivered at the Australian National University, he said:
there is growing support for the view that national security and human rights are not mutually exclusive. This analysis is based on the concept of human security and it builds upon Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that 'everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person'. In broad terms, 'human security' argues that people will only be able to reach their full potential if they live in a secure environment where their fundamental human rights can be realised. Based on this premise, there is not a massive dichotomy between security legislation and human rights. Indeed, the extent to which we can continue to enjoy our civil liberties rests upon the effectiveness of our counter-terrorism laws. I am not suggesting that counter-terrorism legislation should not be scrutinised to ensure that limitations on human rights are minimised. But we must recognise that national security can in fact promote civil liberties by preserving a society in which rights and freedoms can be exercised.
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Essentially, 131 the argument posits that in order to secure the right to life or human security for some, the right to liberty of others must be sacrificed. Although the legislation itself is facially neutral, in practice, these others will often be Muslims. The legislation ignores the fact that by creating a sense of insecurity for these Australian citizens and residents, a sense of grievance that provides fertile ground for extremism may well be created or maintained. This misunderstands the idea of human security -it is not a trade whereby a sense of security is created for some (and a false sense at that) by generating real insecurity for others.
That this insecurity is real is demonstrated by the case of Dr Haneef. Mohamed Haneef was arrested at Brisbane airport on 2 July 2007 on the basis of a suspicion that he was involved in the failed car bombings at Glasgow airport. Dr Haneef was not detained under a preventative detention order, but under a different provision allowing the police to hold a person without charge for an extended interrogation. Under s 23CA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a recently created provision for terrorist investigations, a person may generally be arrested for investigation for up to four hours. 132 An extension of the period for another 20 hours may be sought under s 23DA of the Crimes Act. Dr Haneef was held for 12 days before being charged, as a result of provisions that stop the clock from running when, for example, the detainee is communicating with his or her lawyer or resting. 133 His 'crime' was that he was a cousin of one of the bombers and had lived with this cousin, and he had also 'recklessly' given this cousin his mobile phone SIM card. Originally, it was reported that the card was found in the burnt out car at Glasgow airport, but events subsequently transpired to show that the SIM card was found hundreds of miles away in Liverpool, at the flat which Dr Haneef had shared with his cousin. Eventually charged with providing support for an organisation being reckless as to whether the organisation is a terrorist organisation, 134 the grounds of 'bad character' pursuant to s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). This permitted Dr Haneef to be placed in immigration detention. Ultimately, in a highly embarrassing series of events, the charges were dropped, and Dr Haneef was permitted to leave for India, which he had been trying to reach 24 days earlier, in order to meet his new-born baby girl. 135 In addition, the Federal Court determined that the cancellation of Dr Haneef's visa was invalid.
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A little caution may be required when commenting on Dr Haneef's case given that not all of the evidence known by the police is in the public domain. However, one may hope that the Kafka-esque nature of Dr Haneef's ordeal may have alerted the Australian public to the false hierarchy established by the Australian government, in which human rights are actually traded away in the name of a false sense of security. On the other hand, perhaps the silent majority feels the same way as one member of the public who, after watching the tabloid-style television current affairs program '60 Minutes', expressed sympathy with Dr Haneef but opined that it was the 'price we have to pay' if we want to combat terrorism successfully. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that 'we' are not paying -only Dr Haneef has paid the immediate price -and that the long-term cost to Australians also needs to be considered.
V. Conclusion
The three countries whose laws and practices have been examined in this chapter exist in a shared universe in which one cosmic event has ramifications for other entities in the universe. The US and the UK have attacked the prohibition on torture which was, until now, thought to be absolute and beyond attack in principle (although the practice never conformed to that principle). The results are sadly evident in the appalling pictures of torture that emanated from Abu Ghraib. Torture becomes routine and it degrades the torturer as well as its victims. Victims become terrorists.
The detention practices of each state attempt by various devices to erect a shield against legal scrutiny. None of these attempts may be successful in the end, with Australia's being, perhaps, the most reasonable -a seemingly plausible attempt to milk the legal ambiguity surrounding the concept of preventative detention. However, each of them is fraught with danger from a human rights perspective.
Perhaps the most dangerous of these developments are those in the UK -in many respects a country that could be seen as the Big Bang of human rights. The intervention in the Ramzy Case comes close to a full-frontal attack on the fundamentals of international human rights law, that is, that rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent, and inter-related. The UK's argument may be shown to be spurious or misguided, however, in many ways it is fairly honest and perhaps, therefore, when compared with the language of 'war' used by the US, a more formidable argument that could reshape international human rights law.
I hope not. Human rights have long been criticised for their absolute nature and hidden assumptions that are said to belie their purported universalism. 137 I am, in many respects, a fellow-traveller with these critics. 138 Clearly, however, in the case of the 'fight against terrorism', it would be even worse if human rights failed to remain absolutist at this point, transparently bending to the will of the powerful. In the 'fight against terror', the road to hell is paved with 'balanced' arguments.
